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Thinking with Ulrich Beck: security, terrorism and transformation
Gabriel Mythen
sociology, social Policy and criminology, university of liverpool, liverpool, uk
ABSTRACT
Ulrich Beck is considered to be one of the most innovative and provocative 
social science thinkers of the last 50 years. His landmark contribution, 
Risk Society: Toward a New Modernity (1992), sought to capture the 
underlying dynamics of the late twentieth century, drawing attention to 
the anthropogenic dangers generated by capitalist modernization. First 
published in Germany in 1986 under the title Risikogesellschaft, the best-
selling book was translated into several languages and thrust Beck into the 
academic spotlight. The social and institutional critique presented in Risk 
Society (1992) caused ripples that spread way beyond academia, with the 
risk society thesis becoming the subject of widespread debate. However, 
in the field of risk research, Beck’s work has received a mixed reception. 
While some scholars have contested the foundational claims made in the 
risk society thesis, others have actively deployed the framework to analyze 
various incidents, processes, and transitions. Rather than seeking to cast 
judgment on the value of Beck’s overall contribution to studies of risk in the 
social sciences, this article seeks to actively deploy three concepts developed 
by Beck over the course of his career: staging; organized irresponsibility, and 
emancipatory catastrophism. In order to elucidate the explanatory capacity 
of these concepts, the phenomenon of terrorism is used as a touchstone 
for discussion. Following on from this – and as a means of extending 
appreciation of Beck’s work in risk studies – key areas worthy of further 
excavation are identified.
Introduction
The acclaimed sociologist Ulrich Beck has played a pivotal role in the emergence and development of 
risk as a unit idea in the social sciences (see Elliott 2002; Mythen 2004). Beck’s groundbreaking book Risk 
Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992) produced sizeable impacts in the academy, inspiring scholars to 
adopt and adapt the risk society framework to understand salient problems and issues in the modern 
world (see Mythen 2014; Sznaider 2015). Beck was also considered to be a public intellectual, engaging 
with policy-makers, politicians, journalists, and civic leaders. Always keen to translate his ideas to as wide 
an audience as possible, Beck took his role in the public sphere seriously, readily engaging in open dis-
cussion and frequently writing thought pieces for international newspapers (see Gross 2016, 386; Kaldor 
and Selchow 2015). While here is not the place to document the innumerable achievements of a man 
considered by his colleague Anthony Giddens (2015, 1) to be ‘the greatest sociologist of his generation’, 
it is important to recognize the catalytic impact of Beck’s work on the field of risk studies. This article is 
not intended to demonstrate the panoramic range of Beck’s contribution, nor to trace the fields of risk 
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research in which his work has produced the greatest impact. Aside from the significant theoretical 
contribution – and the sustained international dialog Beck’s work has generated among scholars – it 
is important to appreciate the originality and depth of specific concepts that he developed over the 
course of a distinguished career (Selchow 2016). Following this tact, I wish to isolate three key concepts 
in order to elucidate some of the ways in which Beck’s legacy enables us to continue to grapple with the 
dilemmas of the modern epoch. To avoid lapsing into the realm of generality, I will put these concepts 
to work in relation to a specific example, that of terrorism. In so doing, it is not my intention to assess 
the general applicability of the concepts. Rather, I wish to show how particular aspects of Beck’s ouevre 
can assist us in shining a light on the communication, representation, and management of risk. Applied 
in the context of (inter)national security, discussion will be oriented toward the ideational construction 
and regulation of the terrorist threat. As opposed to simply accepting or rejecting Beck’s macro theo-
retical narrative of risk society, it is important instead to work with the analytical tools that he devised 
in order to stretch and grow knowledge in risk research and, more broadly, within the social sciences. 
The article falls into four interconnected sections. First, the key dimensions of Beck’s groundbreaking 
risk society thesis are sketched out, as a means of both introducing and locating the concepts to be 
utilized. Second, the points of articulation between the risk society perspective and the contemporary 
terrorist threat are identified. Third, three focal concepts developed by Beck are utilized to illuminate 
aspects of the mediation, regulation, and impact of terrorism. Following each application, I indicate 
discrete gaps in knowledge that remain, suggesting future points of empirical entry.
The risk society perspective: contours and dimensions
Beck’s thesis is founded on a series of interconnected claims about the proselytizing character of risk 
in the modern world. The risk society thesis draws distinctions between ‘natural hazards’ deemed to be 
prevalent in pre-industrial cultures and ‘manufactured risks’ that threaten human security in contempo-
rary society. Beck (1995) avers that natural hazards – such as earthquakes and flooding – are, in effect, 
visited on society by nature. These natural hazards tend to dominate in pre-industrial cultures and are 
steadily supplanted in significance in ‘industrial society’ by accidents that primarily result from human 
error. While modes of safety regulation and prediction have the capacity to reduce accidents in indus-
trial society, the motion into a ‘risk society’ is heralded by the emergence of a series of unmanageable 
humanly generated threats, such as nuclear accidents, global warming and international terrorism (Beck 
1992, 2009, 2016). Beck’s argument is built on four assumptions about risk in the modern age. First, he 
postulates that the anthropogenic character of manufactured risks renders them unique. Rather than 
being understood as threats generated by the gods or nature, manufactured risks are perceived to be 
a consequence of human decisions and choices. While the goals and ambitions of capitalist moderniza-
tion may be based around a positive logic of acquiring ‘goods’, this process itself generates unpredicted 
and unpredictable ‘bads’ (Beck 1992, 48). Thus, risks emerge as routine ‘side effects’ of economic, tech-
nological, and scientific development (Beck 2009, 18). Further, Beck argues that harms resulting from 
side effects cannot ultimately be avoided. Here, he alludes to ‘boomerang effects’ whereby the risks 
generated by advanced, affluent nations come back to haunt them, threatening human security and 
well-being (Beck 1992, 36). Second, Beck is keen to emphasize that the scale of danger presented by 
manufactured risks is hitherto unknown. The ultimate end point of environmental risks such as global 
warming is a planet that will be uninhabitable (Beck 2015, 76). The magnitude of the risks unleashed 
by capitalist techno-scientific and economic development is thus considered historically novel. Third, 
modern manufactured risks are delocalized in character (Beck 1992, 1995). The geographical impact 
of manufactured risks is far greater than natural hazards which tended to be locally or regional bound. 
Manufactured risks are global and universal and this presents major challenges in terms of delimiting 
threats. Fourth, again in contrast to natural hazards which can be to some degree institutionally foreseen 
and managed, manufactured risks are unpredictable and beyond regulation: ‘it is not the quantity of risk, 
but the quality of control or – to be more precise – the known uncontrollability of the consequences 
of civilizational decisions, that makes the historical difference’ (Yates 2009, 68). For Beck, the scale of 
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the risks that the world faces, coupled to an institutional incapacity to deal with them, produces a 
climate of indeterminacy in which attempts to map and plan safe futures are perpetually thwarted 
(Beck 2002, 40). In a context of generalized uncertainty, State agencies must act – or choose to remain 
intransigent – on the basis of partial, incomplete, and often contradictory information. For Beck (2009, 
115), such a condition of not knowing is often a direct result of the application of scientific and techno-
logical principles, rather than an absence of them: ‘living in risk society means living with ineradicable 
non-knowing, or nichtwissen, to be precise, with the simultaneity of threats and non-knowing and the 
resulting political, social and moral paradoxes and dilemmas. In contrast to the modern era, it cannot 
be overcome by more and better knowledge, more and better science; rather precisely the opposite 
holds: it is the product of more and better science’. The problem of incomplete knowledge produces 
tangible problems so far as agencies involved in risk communication and risk governance are concerned. 
While technological and scientific advances enable detection of a greater range of harms – often at 
earlier points of gestation – the residual uncertainties that may remain about the scale, geography 
and effects of risk, mean that risk regulation is an arduous endeavor (see Wardman and Mythen 2017). 
This dilemma is captured well in the much maligned – but otherwise perceptive – remarks made by 
the former US Secretary of Defense, Rumsfeld (2002) regarding institutional knowledge about the 
terrorist threat: ‘as we know, there are known knowns; there are things that we know that we know. We 
also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. 
But there are also unknown unknowns, the ones we don’t know we don’t know’. The various states of 
partial knowledge and non-knowledge captured in this conundrum places institutions responsible for 
the security of citizens in something of a dilemma. As Beck (1999, 78) posits: ‘the ultimate deadlock of 
risk society … resides in the gap between knowledge and decision: there is no one who really knows 
the global outcome – at the level of positive knowledge, the situation is radically ‘undecideable’ – but 
we nonetheless have to decide … so risk society is provoking an obscene gamble, a kind of ironic 
reversal of predestination: I am accountable for decisions which I was forced to make without proper 
knowledge of the situation’. Aside from the interesting philosophical issues that this quandary raises, 
it is evident that pressures to acknowledge residual uncertainties in situations of risk have impacted 
heavily on social institutions from law, criminal justice, policing and the intelligence services to medical 
health, politics and finance (see Nielsen and Sorenson 2015). While strategies developed to manage, 
regulate and communicate uncertainty vary across and within sectors, the catastrophic potential of 
‘worst imaginable accidents’ means that the stakes cannot be higher for regulatory institutions (Beck 
2002, 9). Insofar as uncertainty is a characteristic property of risk situations, Beck avers that the quality 
of that uncertainty has become more pronounced at the very time that the magnitude of harm has 
increased. In effect, the ‘old risks’ are being replaced by ‘new risks’, which threaten not only to derail 
the system, but, moreover, possess the capacity to render human life extinct (Beck 2009, 19). We can 
thus see a dualism in Beck’s approach to risks which are considered to be at once socially constructed 
yet also real. Indeed, while Beck has been criticized for oscillating between constructivist and realist 
paradigms in his treatment of risk, he has consistently defended his blended approach, rejecting what 
he calls the ‘either/or’ and embracing the principle of ‘and’ (Beck 1999, 2016)
In refining the risk society thesis, Beck (2009, 2015, 2016) focused on three axial areas of analy-
sis: environmental, economic, and security risks. For analytical purposes, it is the latter that will be 
considered in the remainder of this article, using the threat of terrorism as an axis for debate. Before 
illustrating the potential of Beckian concepts, it is first necessary to provide a capsule account of the 
key dynamics of the threat.
Terrorism: through the risk society lens
Despite being historically omnipresent, terrorism has featured as a focal political issue in Western 
nations over the last two decades. The events of 9/11 in particular, set in train wide-ranging transfor-
mations in military practices, counter-terrorism legislation, data gathering, and modes of policing (see 
Amoore 2013; Beck 2002). While the focus of intelligence has shifted from the risk posed by individuals 
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associating with al Qaeda to those taking up arms on behalf of the Islamic State (IS), fears about attacks 
conducted by individuals attaching to radical groups have been high on the security radar in Europe, 
following on from serious incidents in France, the UK, Germany, and Belgium (see Abbas 2017; Mythen 
and Walklate 2016). Although the present political and security focus is trained on individuals that have 
become radicalized through engagement with proponents of IS, it is fair to say that the shock generated 
by the 2001 attacks in America continues to reverberate in public discourse and at the level of policy. 
Post 9/11, the clamor to try and understand these grisly happenings led not only to common assump-
tions crystallizing around an apparent sea change in the level of threat, but also the consolidation of an 
ideology fixed on transformations in the nature of terrorism. This trend steadily gathered momentum 
in politics, the media and security industries, being underpinned by academic work focused on the 
emergence of ‘new’ or ‘postmodern’ terrorism (see Martin 2014, 268; Morgan 2004). While the roots and 
causes of the contemporary threat remain a source of heated debate, it has commonly been assumed 
by analysts within the media, politics, policy and intelligence circles that the contemporary threat of 
terrorism is of a qualitatively different nature and a quantitatively higher order of magnitude in com-
parison with previous epochs (see Hoffman 1999; Malesevic 2010, 213). Although the discourse of ‘new 
terrorism’ came to be dominant post 9/11, it is interesting to observe that debates about the changing 
nature of terrorism preceded the 2001 attacks on the United States. Laqueur (1996, 26), for instance, 
writing some five years before 9/11, argued for a reconfigured understanding of political violence, 
stating that ‘current definitions of terrorism fail to capture the magnitude of the problem worldwide’. 
While Laqueur’s ideas initially elicited a limited degree of interest among intelligence experts and 
media commentators, his conception of a new paradigm of terrorism was taken up with vim after 9/11.
In many respects, the task of governing terrorism has become increasingly difficult over the last 
two decades as a result of a number of interconnected factors, including the stretched geography of 
threats, violence enacted by so-called ‘clean skins’ and ‘lone wolves’ and the widening variety of modes 
of attack. Due to advances in the identification and detection of risks, we are now cognizant of the 
interconnectedness of potential harms and the complexities involved in establishing interconnections 
within networks (see Mennen and van Tuyll 2015). Identifying and managing threats in a globalized 
world is a challenging business for States, international organizations, scientific experts indeed citizens 
themselves (see Cantelli, Kodate, and Krieger 2011). Indeed, what are often considered ‘positive’ aspects 
of globalization – notably the enhanced mobility of people, information, products and services – can, 
paradoxically, aid the fluidity of security risks. But to what extent has the terrorist threat transformed 
the landscape of security? Moreover, how can Beckian concepts facilitate an appreciation of the nature 
and regulation of political and religiously motivated violence?
Having sketched out the general contours of the contemporary security landscape and considered 
the testing conditions within which risk-regulating agencies must operate, I now wish to show how the 
risk society thesis can illumine aspects of the social construction and institutional management of the 
terrorist threat. If we consider the key dimensions of the risk society thesis, it is easy to see why Beck 
(2016, 59) considered terrorism to be a prime example of manufactured risk in contemporary society. 
In the first instance, the threat is indubitably anthropogenic. The conflicts and disputes that motivate 
individuals to commit to organized violence are rooted in human culture, religious narratives, political 
standpoints, and shared histories. If we reflect on the roots of the current threat to Western nations 
posed by Islamist radical groups, it is clear that formerly colonialism and, latterly, aggressive neoliberal 
economic expansion and cultural imperialism have generated the violent ‘boomerang effect’ of ter-
rorism, which also emerges partly as a ‘side effect’ of the global expansion of turbo capitalism. Further, 
the tools created and wielded by terrorist groups are themselves the products of technological and 
scientific advances, from use of the internet as a vehicle for propaganda to the propagation of chemical 
and biological substances for malevolent use. Second, in addition to being anthropogenic in nature, 
the terrorist threat is representative of a category of high consequence risks that Beck (2016, 69) flags 
as emblematic of the modern age. In comparison with historical precursors, the ‘high-lethality’ attacks 
launched by modern terrorist networks result in large numbers of human casualties (Hoffman 1999). 
Although civilians were frequently killed in attacks by traditional terrorist organizations such as the IRA 
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and ETA, their strategic objectives were primarily geared toward destabilizing the State by damaging 
infrastructure and disrupting capital accumulation. In sharp contrast, the attacks executed by new 
terrorist groups seek to maximize on harm to human life (see Laqueur 1996, 32; Walsh 2016, 6). Over 15 
years on from 9/11, concerns continue to be expressed by security and intelligence experts about the 
dire consequences of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attacks by extremist groups (Sheldon 
2012, 171). Third, aligning with Beck’s thesis, it can also be argued that the contemporary terrorist threat 
has global reach (see Bowling and Sheptycki 2013, 29; Malesevic 2010, 84). To illustrate this point, 
The Global Terrorism Database shows that 92 countries suffered terrorist attacks in 2015 (Institute for 
Economics and Peace 2016, 13). The permeability of borders in the modern age – intensified through 
the articulation of various facets of globalization – serves only to accelerate the liquidity of risks (Beck 
2016, 7). In as much as twentieth century conflicts involving religious and politically motivated violence 
were relatively local in terms of both actor involvement and sites of attack, the modern terrorist threat 
is global, involving networks of individuals ‘acting beyond and across borders’ (Beck 2016, 9). While 
traditional terrorist groups such as the IRA and ETA operated with a clear local command structure, 
new terrorist groups inspire individuals located within transnational networks to conduct attacks (see 
Burke 2005; Morgan 200). The globality of the threat is exemplified by the cross-continental attacks 
executed by individuals affiliating with the Islamic State. In as much as the turn to religious fundamen-
talism is considered by Beck (2016, 10) to be a response to the fragmentation and uncertainties of the 
risk society, it is clear that ideological conflicts that were once local or regional have become global, 
with State and non State actors entangled in sporadic ‘risk wars’, involving multiple parties (Beck 2009, 
149). The current situation in Syria acts as a prime example of this type of messy conflict involving a 
range of international actors and producing global effects in terms of insecurity, migration and portable 
violence (Chulov 2015). The inability of governments, nation states, military institutions, and interna-
tional peace keeping organizations to effectively resolve situations such as Syria is symptomatic of the 
challenges of a post insurance society in which tried and tested forms of regulation fail: in effect, ‘there 
is no institutional answer’ (Beck 2015, 68). As we shall see, rather than intervening with the expectation 
of positive impact, Beck argues that institutional actors are instead bound up with a dramaturgical 
performance of risk management.
The representation and management of terrorism: stretching Beckian concepts
Although Beck himself was never a proponent of the new terrorism thesis, it is striking how many over-
laps there are with the risk society thesis in terms of the global nature of the threat, the relative power-
lessness of regulatory structures and the potentially catastrophic scale of the problem. In this regard, 
the risk society thesis does provide us with a feasible framework for conceptualizing the contemporary 
terrorist threat. Nevertheless, it is important to keep sight of continuities in the use of religious and/or 
politically motivated violence as well as elements of transformation (see Copeland 2001; Walklate and 
Mythen 2015). While the problem of terrorism would seem to have a neat fit with the major tenets of 
the risk society thesis, there are also fault lines. In a somewhat febrile environment in which citizens are 
encouraged to ‘think security’ (de Lint and Virta 2004), there is a need to keep sight of the probable risk 
of being a victim of a terrorist attack, as opposed to the hypothetical possibility. Despite recent attacks 
in the UK, Belgium, France, and Germany, there have been very few large-scale terrorist incidents in the 
West since 9/11. Against the backdrop of a sharp rise in global fatalities as a result of terrorism since 
2012, the death toll in Western Europe has actually decreased steadily since the early 1990s (see Barr 
2016). Data compiled by The Global Terrorism Database, for instance, show that while terrorism may 
be transnational, it remains a geographically concentrated form of violence (Institute for Economics 
and Peace 2016). The large majority of deaths resulting from terrorism in 2015 can be attributed to just 
four Islamist militant groups: Islamic State, al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, and the Taliban. Further, almost three 
quarters of total fatalities occurred in just five countries: Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria 
(Institute for Economics and Peace 2016, 3). In as much as these data give us a sobering view of the 
uneven global spread of the terrorist threat, the idea that Western nations are especially vulnerable 
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to attack remains ubiquitous in media, political, and intelligence circles. Of course, the recent spate of 
terrorist attacks in London between March and May of 2017 may be a harbinger of an intensified cycle of 
violence. Nevertheless, it is necessary to disentangle the past and the present from the potentialities of 
the future. In as much as the risk of chemical, biological, or radiological attacks has been well publicized, 
it is important to differentiate worst-case fears from concrete probabilities. Noting the general caveats 
above, I wish now to drill down to a deeper level of specific analysis, drawing on the conceptual tools 
that Beck bequeathed the social sciences to further our understanding of security issues in the modern 
world. While there are multiple possibilities in this regard, I wish to concentrate on just three concepts 
that have the capacity to be put to wider use in risk research: staging; organized irresponsibility and 
emancipatory catastrophism (see Beck 1995, 2009, 2016).
Responding to criticisms that the role of the media in the social construction of risk was under 
developed in Risk Society (1992), in later work, Beck developed the concept of ‘staging’ to explain how 
risks are pre-emptively brought to the attention of the public (Beck 2009, 2016). For him, the ‘staging of 
risk’ (2009, 10) has become an increasingly common feature of the modern multi-media landscape and 
one which involves a variety of institutions and actors. Staging represents an attempt to publicly play 
out future risks through processes of pre-visualization. For Beck (2009, 157), ‘the globalization of the 
expectation of terrorist attacks’ has impacted markedly on public perceptions of security. Yet staging 
is much more than a practice of imagining the future. Rather, forms of representing potential harms 
of the future generate both ideational and material effects: ‘it is not the terrorist act that destroys the 
West, but the reaction to its anticipation’ (Beck 2009, 157). The contemporary penchant for staging in 
relation to terrorism – politically, culturally, and socially – can also be indexed to the 9/11 attacks. Since 
2001, consideration of hypothetical attacks that may transpire in the future has indubitably acceler-
ated. The 9/11 Commission (2004) itself concluded that tried and tested modes of risk assessment and 
horizon scanning previously utilized by the security and intelligence services were insufficient to deter 
a determined and diffuse enemy. The 2001 attacks on America were – in the words of the Commission 
– constitutive of ‘a failure of imagination’ (see Cornwell 2011). As Beck (2009, 10) observes, the com-
munication of security strategies post 9/11 has involved exhortations to envisage the aforementioned 
‘worst imaginable accidents’. What he is keen to highlight is that frequent discussion and visualization 
of hypothetical attacks in the mass media generates a climate of concern around terrorism: ‘the ‘reality’ 
of the terrorist attack is the product of missionary self-promotion in the mass media and omnipresence 
of the obscene images of violence’ (2009, 72). Public acknowledgment of the uncertainty gap facing 
security providers may well be a positive development in terms of encouraging vigilance, but focusing 
intently on this gap has induced a plethora of techniques of imagining, ranging from documentaries 
playing out the possible effects of ‘dirty bomb’ attacks, to coverage of emergency service dry runs of 
responses to a chemical attack on underground transport networks. Crucially, the mediation of possible 
attacks is not an activity which has remained confined within broadcast media, political, and security 
communities. It also occurs with frequency in the realm of popular culture, where a variety of fictional 
security futures are played out in popular television dramas, such as 24, Homelands, and Spooks. It is 
difficult to calibrate the impacts of these types of cultural representations on people’s perceptions of 
the threat level, save to say that it is unlikely to be nil. For Beck, the perceived threat of terrorism has the 
capacity to be productive in terms of conducting progressive change: ‘global risk is not global catastro-
phe. It is the anticipation of catastrophe. It implies that it is time to act … global risk is the day-to-day 
sense of insecurity that we can no longer accept’ (Beck 2016, 42). As we shall see, Beck (2016, 67) is 
generally sanguine about the political possibilities of staging and the capacity of the media to ‘socially 
explode’ threats. Yet, there are reasons to be cautious about the potentialities of the media for social 
enlightenment. Without doubt, the mass media – and social media platforms – have the capacity to 
inform and educate citizens on issues of risk and security. Nevertheless, history shows distinct possibili-
ties for misrepresentation, distortion, and misinterpretation (Mythen 2014, 94). To this end, more critical 
approaches to ‘pre-mediation’ have been developed by security studies thinkers, keen to emphasize 
the disciplinary impacts of such forms of representation (see Amoore and de Goede 2008; Grusin 2004). 
While raising awareness of the terrorist threat may be a positive process in terms of encouraging public 
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vigilance, a sense of proportion is necessary, coupled to an appreciation of the likelihood of being a 
victim relative to other risks. It is not always the case that institutional actors involved in risk communi-
cation clearly convey that terrorist attacks may be high consequence in terms of impact, but – despite 
recent events – remain low in terms of frequency of occurrence (see Barr 2016; Mythen 2016). Thus, the 
overall utility of staging as a mode of preparation and preparedness remains the subject of debate. In 
as much as one would expect the security services and those involved in emergency planning to be 
horizon scanning and evaluating resource capacity to respond to a range of potential threats, staging 
can also intensify anxieties around national security and may fuel a climate in which particular groups 
are uniformly labeled as risky and dangerous (Walklate and Mythen 2015). While encouraging reflection 
on safety and promoting preparedness is not a bad thing in and of itself, the melding together of tan-
gible threats and feverish worst-case scenarios, can make it difficult to separate out rumor from truth. 
One standout case is that of the alleged ‘foiled plot’ to bomb Old Trafford football stadium by Islamist 
extremists during a Manchester United football match. Despite frenetic media reporting, no such plot 
existed and the ‘suspects’ who had been arrested were subsequently released without charge. It later 
transpired that the 10 men detained were Manchester United supporters that had collected and dis-
played ticket stubs and club souvenirs. This, it seems, had aroused police suspicion and the imagined 
plot was then leaked by a police officer to journalists (see Sheldon 2012, 156).
In what is being dubbed a ‘post-truth’ world, the media–politics nexus is a particularly crucial dis-
tributive channel of (mis)information. The Republican Party led by Donald Trump has already under-
scored this point since coming to power in America in November 2016. At a public rally in Florida, 
Trump recounted a terror attack in Sweden which was fictitious, while his campaign manager Kellyanne 
Conway, asserted that the travel ban imposed on visitors from seven Muslim-majority countries was 
justified due to incidents such as the ‘Bowling Green massacre’, conducted by two Iraqi immigrants to 
the United States (Phipps 2017). In reality, two Iraqi men currently living in Bowling Green, Kentucky 
were arrested in 2011 and convicted of shipping weapons and money from the United States to Iraq. 
Yet there was no ‘massacre’ and no charges of planning a terrorist attack were heard in court. Such 
examples may seem inconsequential, but they are actually important in terms of the shaping of public 
knowledge about terrorism. The State has a responsibility to act proportionately to keep the public 
safe, but it also has a responsibility to allay rather than ratchet up public anxieties. Of course, there is 
nothing novel about the political harnessing of fear, which can be traced back to the times of Machiavelli 
and before (see Furedi 2005, 132; Walsh 2016, 1). Nevertheless, in the case of modern terrorism, it is 
probable that the range and depth of the uncertainties – allied to the potential magnitude of the 
threat – have served to advance the possibilities of managing through fear. Arguably, Beck’s thesis is 
not sufficiently attuned to the ways in which discourses and representations of risk can be wielded for 
instrumental ends by powerful institutions and actors. In accentuating the collective possibilities of 
‘bads’ in terms of galvanizing counter measures to combat threats, Beck somewhat overlooks extant 
power relations. Awareness of the deleterious consequences of global risks does not mechanically 
translate into effective direct action, less still progressive social change. Instead, a variety of factors 
interrupt – and potentially prevent – this possibility, including resource capability, State coercion, and 
intervention by economic stakeholders. Of course, different people, in different contexts will perceive 
different threats differently. Nevertheless, the net result of various forms of staging of terrorist attacks 
post 9/11 is a climate of uncertainty in which calls for more stringent ‘security measures’ by the State can 
be more confidently pitched. To this end, neo-Foucauldians have drawn attention to the ways in which 
the neoliberal State is capable of governing through terrorism, growing infrastructures of social control 
(Aradau and van Munster 2008). As Crawford and Hutchinson (2016, 1039) posit: ‘by voicing security, 
things that might be ordinarily untenable become not only thinkable but acceptable, including the 
introduction of extraordinary or exceptional new legislative powers or special measures’. Thus, we can 
chart nodal connections from staging (via discourse and/or image) to the more material forms of risk 
regulation that become embedded in policy initiatives, legislation, and police interventions. While the 
route from representation to practice is far from linear, it is nonetheless important to reflect on the rela-
tionship between discourse, policy formation, and preventative practices. As Hudson (2013, 3) suggest: 
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‘fear of terrorist attacks has led the citizens of the affluent countries of the West to support infringements 
on liberties … fear has also led to increased surveillance of social groups thought to be the source of 
the terrorists, to increase detention without trial of terrorist suspects, increased immigration controls 
and even to tolerance of torture’. All of this suggests that further exploration – and refinement – of the 
concept of staging would be beneficial within risk studies. Indeed, there are several intriguing questions 
that fall out of the discussion above. How powerful are media representations of risk in structuring 
public understandings of terrorism? To what extent and how do ‘factual’ and ‘fictional’ representations 
of terrorism commingle in people’s mental maps of the terrorist threat? What is the balance between 
raising awareness and generating moral panic in communicating the terrorist risk to and what are the 
mediating factors in this regard? Such questions are indicative of but some of the untapped areas of 
research that might be profitably mined in future.
While staging throws light on the ways in which institutions bring future threats into view, the 
concept of ‘organized irresponsibility’ describes the stage management of risk (Beck 1995, 61). Beck 
argues that organized irresponsibility effectively equates to a bluff, enacted as a means of demon-
strating a semblance of control. Epitomizing the maxim that there is ‘no institutional answer’, organ-
ized irresponsibility describes how and why regulatory agencies ‘simultaneously work and fail’ (Beck 
2016, 141). For Beck, organizations responsible for safety and security operate in a context in which 
effective risk management is often impossible. A combustible combination of the global nature of 
risks that transcend national boundaries, the volatility of hazards and residual uncertainties about 
the impacts of risk being aired in the public sphere leaves risk regulating institutions in a position of 
relative powerlessness: ‘institutional power holders are rendered accountable for making decisions in 
a miasma of imperfect information and incomplete knowledge’ (Beck 1999, 78). Nevertheless, despite 
the uncertainties surrounding risk such as terrorism, institutions must still be seen to be acting in the 
interests of public safety. Thus, various forms of obfuscation, deflection, and mystification which seek 
to ‘symbolically detoxify’ risks ensue (Beck 1992, 65). What Beck is seeking to illuminate through the 
concept of organized irresponsibility is the apparent mismatch between the force of manufactured 
risks and the safety capability of contemporary institutions. In effect, security providing institutions 
designed to deal with twentieth century hazards are unable to prevent the spread of volatile risks in 
the modern world: ‘faced with manufactured not knowing about existential risks to humanity, the 
nationally bounded and grounded juridical or legal standards and the universal scientific norms of 
causality simultaneously function and fail’ (Beck 2016, 98). While being impotent against the mobility 
and potency of contemporary risks, social institutions must perform various forms of calibration and 
surveillance: ‘the restless search for lost security begins through measures and strategies that lend 
the appearance of control and security instead of guaranteeing them’ (Beck 2009, 156). In as much 
as organized irresponsibility captures well the issues faced by institutions bound up with countering 
terrorism, to understand the shifting dimensions of risk management, it is also important to grasp the 
salience of what neo-Foucauldian thinkers have dubbed ‘responsibilisation’ (see Garland 2001; O’Malley 
1992). This process describes the steady devolution of responsibility for risk from the State to citizens 
observable across multiple domains, ranging from national security and crime control through to edu-
cation, health, and welfare support (see Crawford and Hutchinson 2016; de Lint and Virta 2004; O’Malley 
2009). In as much as practices of organized irresponsibility constitute the performance of control, it is 
also important to focus on the broader divestment of State responsibility for security threats and the 
process of transference of risk management to private individuals. If the public can be encouraged to 
think about future modes of attack, risk awareness can be enhanced and the public can be informed 
about counter-measures that might be taken to reduce risk. Thus, both staging and organized irrespon-
sibility are wedded to modes of responsibilization through which citizens are encouraged to partake 
in security seeking behavior for themselves, their communities and the State. If individuals, groups, 
and communities can be encouraged to develop resilience against terrorism, the security burden of 
the State is ideationally, materially, and economically reduced (Walklate and Mythen 2015). In the UK 
responsibilization around terrorism takes many forms and is embedded in government-funded projects 
based among communities in which young people ‘at risk’ of radicalization live, advertisements that 
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invite citizens to look out for suspicious behavior on public transport and the issuing of emergency 
advice booklets to educate the public in how best to prepare for large-scale attacks (see Kearon, Mythen, 
and Walklate 2007; Thomas 2016). Beck is certainly not blind to the privatization of risk management, 
but the transference of responsibility from the State to the individual is arguably more pronounced 
in neoliberal capitalist contexts than he was willing or able to acknowledge. While concentrating on 
the everyday effects of cosmopolitanization steered Beck toward accentuating the need for collective 
international responses to global security problems, the atomizing and individualizing processes char-
acteristic of neoliberal capitalism are understated. This does leave open some interesting avenues of 
empirical inquiry within risk research around political economy and the operation of power that may 
reap dividends. How do actors within institutions conceive of their relative power (lessness) in terms of 
risk management strategies? In risk incidents, how much information regarding residual uncertainties 
should be shared with the public and why? Can distinct types of uncertainty be codified and to what 
extent do people react differently to different types of not knowing (see Gross 2016, 397)? Is resilience a 
tangible facet of human durability to be championed, or simply a cynical policy construct operationalize 
to facilitate transfer responsibility for risk management?
Having discussed the explanatory potential of staging and organized irresponsibility, it is now nec-
essary to turn to the concept of ‘emancipatory catastrophism’, developed by Beck (2016) in his final 
piece of work on metamorphosis. In a nutshell, the theory of metamorphosis is intended to capture 
the dramatic changes that have swept through the modern world, impacting both human security and 
the lived environment. Beck stresses at length that metamorphosis is not commensurate with social 
change. Rather, the metamorphosis of the world generates consequences that are global and seismic 
(Beck 2016, 4). Vitally, these consequences serve to catalyze progressive social and political action. 
Nested within the broader theory of metamorphosis, Beck (2016, 146) shines a light on what he calls ‘the 
emancipatory side effects of global risk’. To this end, his reasoning is that contemporary security threats 
possess the capability to generate revamped normative horizons that disrupt the narrow limitations of 
closed, national perspectives. Balking at inward looking national approaches to security management, 
Beck (2015, 76) forwards instead a ‘cosmopolitan perspective where the unit of research is a community 
of risk, which includes what is excluded in the national perspective: that is, the decision makers and the 
consequences of their decisions for others across time and space’. The promise of metamorphosis is that 
it opens up the possibility that – given broader and deeper public involvement – social institutions can 
transcend practices of organized irresponsibility (2015, 75). Metamorphosis is thus both a value-driven 
normative process and a form of institutional reflexivity (Beck 2016, 134). While world risk society the-
ory focuses on the negative environmental side effects of the production of goods, metamorphosis 
reveals the positive side effects of bads that are capable of catalyzing ‘common goods’. Crucially, it is 
the staging of risk that provides the possibility of galvanizing transnational action: ‘media portrayals 
of globally shared risk scenarios … give rise to the emergence of new cosmopolitan affiliations of risk’ 
(Beck and Levy 2013, 7). To capture the emancipatory side effects of global risk, Beck (2015, 75) argues 
that (mediated) exposure to a range of transgressive and distressing incidents and episodes, produces 
cultural jolts which serve as turning points: ‘anthropological shocks occur when many populations feel 
that they have been subjected to horrendous events that leave indelible marks on their consciousness, 
will mark their memories forever, and will change their future in fundamental and irrevocable ways’ (Beck 
2016, 122). Importantly, anthropological shocks can be experienced remotely as well as proximately, 
leading to reflection on moments of ‘moral violation’ (Beck 2015). Importantly, these violations have the 
capacity to reset ethical and moral compasses: ‘it is … identification with the suffering of others, that 
triggers an anthropological shock capable of abruptly changing the political landscape’ (Beck 2016, 128). 
Not only do such anthropological shocks impact on and re-orient worldviews they have the capacity 
to drive forward progressive and radical change (2015, 80). In Beck’s view, extreme ‘bads’ harbor the 
potential to create normative horizons of common goods, stimulating reflection on questions of justice. 
This process of ‘social catharsis’ can facilitate the development of new normative horizons and has the 
potential to reconfigure cultural practices. While Beck is keen to emphasize the wide-ranging effects 
of global bads, he also draws attention to the routine nature of the process: ‘the metamorphosis of the 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
AQ9
RJRR 1362028 
9 August 2017 Initial
CE: XX QA: XX
Coll:XX QC:XX
10  G. MYTHEN
world is happening’ (2016, 150). In many respects then, emancipatory catastrophism is the flipside of 
organized irresponsibility, in that it brings to the fore problems and issues which institutions have pre-
viously tried to conceal. For Beck (2016, 134), the metamorphosis of the world – driven by (mediated) 
exposure to bads – is inexorable: ‘you cannot log out of public bads. There is no escape’. It is clear to 
see how emancipatory catastrophism builds on the architecture of the risk society thesis, remodeling 
the goods/bads dichotomy and drawing on the previously develop notion of social explosiveness. As 
his thought evolved in line with changing real-world conditions, Beck’s attention shifted from consid-
ering attempts to avoid ‘bads’ to exploring their emancipatory potential. It is the universal and global 
nature of risks that have intensified and become transnational, producing ‘moments of shared fate’ 
(Beck 2016, 59). It is possible to see how the notion of ‘emancipatory catastrophism’ could serve as 
an anchor for further research in risk studies. To what extent and in which contexts are risk incidents 
deemed to transgress publically acceptable levels? Which kinds of risk incidents are likely to induce 
moral violation and why? To what extent do social bads generate fresh horizons of common goods? 
What is the role of social media in galvanizing public opposition to global risks? Are people cognitively 
able to ‘log out’ of public bads? If so, is this a result of desensitization, compassion fatigue, or other 
economic and socio-cultural factors?
Conclusion
It has been demonstrated here that Beck’s risk society thesis provides us with a theoretical entry point 
through which to appreciate the changing dynamics of politically and religiously motivated violence. 
Using the construction and management of the terrorism risk as a hanger for discussion, we have eluci-
dated the explanatory potential of three Beckian concepts. Broadening out from this narrow endeavor, 
it is clear that the concepts discussed – organized irresponsibility, emancipatory catastrophism, and 
staging – have portability across a range of domains and are ripe for future exploration. Notwithstanding 
the potentialities of applying these concepts to the undulating modern habitat, it is also important to 
draw inspiration from Beck’s critical but optimistic spirit and to promote the tradition of curious intel-
lectual inquiry that characterized his work. Beck always refused to be categorized and constrained by 
conventional disciplinary boundaries. His was a restless project and he embraced his role as a querden-
ker, championing provocative, and lateral thought (see Kaldor and Selchow 2015). To the end, Beck 
remained sanguine that the ‘politics of visibility’ (2016, 126) could serve to galvanie the progressive 
types of action required to counter risks to human security. For him, the social sciences in general – and 
risk researchers in particular – have a vital role to play in raising awareness of the positive possibilities 
of risk and advising on strategies to improve decision-making in the context of uncertainty and non 
knowledge: ‘this state of reflexive unawareness poses key challenges not only to risk research … it is 
much more than that. It is the coincidence, the coexistence of not knowing and global risks which 
characterizes the existential moments of decision not only in politics and science but also in everyday 
life situations’ (2016, 104). In line with the trajectory of this Special Edition, the primary ambition of 
this article has been to bring into purview aspects of Ulrich Beck’s contribution to risk research and to 
explore the promise of Beckian concepts for future inquiry. In addition to showing how the concepts 
devised and developed by Beck can illumine social problems and processes, it is important to consider 
how risk researchers can pick up and run with the gauntlet that Beck carried so capably and diligently 
throughout his academic career. While Beck’s intellectual quest was unfinished, his legacy provides 
ample opportunity for exploration and academic adventure. One of Beck’s driving motivations in his 
later years was to energize and inspire a cadre of international scholars to push forward with theoreti-
cal development and empirical analysis of theories of risk, cosmopolitanization, and individualization. 
In this he succeeded and the ample fruits of his labors will continue to be harvested in coming years.
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